weapons updated by Global Positioning Satellites (GPS) for guidance to the target; (3) autonomous weapons with terrain-aided INS/GPS systems; (4) autonomous weapons with INS/GPS systems and template matching algorithms for guidance; (5) anti-emitter PGMs that rely on onboard systems to home on emitting targets such as enemy radars; and (6) PGMs with "smart" submunitions that use various sensors to guide themselves to targets. See 1947-1997, at 7 (1997) .
'Id.
"Id.
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We have already experienced the implications of this new paradigm. For example, the Gulf War air attack on Iraqi forces retreating down what is now popularly known as the "Highway of Death" fully complied, in my view, with the law of armed conflict. Nevertheless, uncertainties as to the impact on world opinion of the shocking televised images of the de struction contributed to the decision to end the ground war after only one hundred hours. This is, perhaps, a good example of why perceptions of the lawfulness of the conduct of military operations are so important. Professors W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou explain:
In modern popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict requires a substantial base of public support. That support can erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no matter how worthy the political objective, if people believe that the war is being conducted in an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way.7
Of course, one hopes?and rightly expects?that American troops will fight in an ethical and lawful way simply because it is the right and moral thing to do. But as Reisman and Antoniou indicate, there are very practical and almost Machiavellian reasons for doing so these days. In order to succeed in modern conflicts, that is, to maintain the Clausewitzean notion of the "people's" support, it is necessary to act in compliance with international legal mores not only in fact, but also in perception.
This new paradigm?which is more a political requirement than a legal one?is generally understood by the current generation of military officers, at least in the United States. Most military personnel are, for example, well aware of the law of armed conflict and especially the importance of avoiding collateral damage and civilian casualties. My own experience during Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 convinces me that as a nation we have enjoyed considerable success at ensuring that our military personnel have received the necessary training. Rarely were there any instances in which serious LOAC issues, per se, were raised. If anything, there was a predisposition to take extraordinary steps beyond those required by international law.
Complicating military operations today is the new technological capability of the global news media to examine every detail of virtually any use of force. Thus, military operations are very rapidly subject to judgment in the court of world opinion. As a practical matter, this means that military leaders must not only act in a lawful fashion, they must be able to prove that they have done so. Consider the situation that arose in connection with the raid by U.S. forces on a pharmaceutical factory in the Sudan in August 1998. This facility was believed by American intelligence to be, among other things, connected with a precursor compound, EMPTA, used in the manufacture of the nerve gas VX. Following the raid, however, the news media widely reported that the plant also manufactured medicines, thus raising questions about the propriety of the strike. Initially, U.S. authorities were reluctant to release any details of the information justifying the attack. However, pressure from the world community, including several allies, eventually resulted in a more specific accounting.
In the future military leaders contemplating an operation against an urbanized, dual-use target must accept that they may very likely be obliged if not by law, then by popular opinion, to disclose supporting evidence. Where the sources and methods of the intelligence systems that provide such data are too sensitive to allow such disclosure, consideration must to be given to identifying a different target or node, one evidenced by less sensitive sources. In other words, military leaders must be prepared to openly prove the legitimacy of the targeting This does not, of course, mean that such systems cannot be attacked. What it does mean is that military leaders and their legal advisors need better decision-support tools. They need the data to allow them to evaluate whether or not the military advantage likely to be achieved is outweighed by the adverse effects on noncombatants and their property; in other words, they need the information necessary to conduct the "proportionality" analysis required by inter national law and ethical warfare.11
One way of obtaining the necessary tools and data might be to employ the new modeling and simulation techniques now becoming available. For example, using data drawn from the Joint Resource Assessment Data Base, the U.S. Strategic Command's Strategic War Planning System can project the expected numbers of killed and injured when a given nuclear weapon is delivered by a designated platform in a certain fashion on the selected target. 19, 1976, para. 5-3c(l)(b)(I)(c). 12 The system uses terms that have specific definitions and this affects the evaluation. For example, "casualties" are defined as the "estimated number of people who die or receive injuries that require medical treatment due to short term effects (6 months) of nuclear detonations." "Population at Risk" is defined as the "total civilian population in danger of dying, independent of shelter, from short term (6 months) effects of nuclear detonations." See However, modeling and simulation themselves present significant re-complications for military leaders. Specifically, are these leaders legally or morally obliged to follow the model?
Suppose, for example, that a decision maker chooses a course of action that the model shows will result in greater noncombatant casualties than another available option. Since the legal duty is to "take all feasible precautions" to avoid noncombatant casualties,13 if a computer calculates that a certain method of attack among several options most minimizes noncombatant losses, does that automatically preclude consideration of the other options? If a commander selects another option, has he or she failed to do everything "feasible" to avoid noncombatant losses? How will a commander justify a decision that seems to fly in the face of dispassionate computer logic? As technology progresses one might fairly expect the fidelity of the models to improve,14 but it is not yet clear that they can ever substitute for the judgment of the commander in the performance of the war-fighting art. The linear, mathematical nature of computer processes may never be able to replicate the nonlinear and often unquantifiable logic of war.15 The history of human conflict is littered with examples of how military forces achieved results that no algorithm would have predicted.16 Still, the world increasingly considers reports provided by an electronic brain innately more authoritative than human-derived analyses. Thus, it may well behoove legal advisors to military leaders in future conflicts to somehow capture their rationale when selecting a computer-produced option that appears to be more casualty intensive than another course of action assessed by the same source.
There is a flip side to the issue of dual-use facilities, and that is the increasing reliance of Of particular concern in this regard is the role of space in future conflicts. Many space systems have dual uses. Satellites provide critical surveillance and communication support for both civilian enterprises and U.S. forces. The same is true with respect to potential adversaries.
According to General Charles A. Horner, the Gulf War hero and former commander of the U.S. Space Command, space systems are "fundamental to modern warfare."18 While there are some purely military space systems today, the U.S. military itself relies heavily on civilian satellites, many of which are owned by international consortiums. These same systems are vital to the health of purely civilian activities in many nations.
Because of the importance of space to military operations, the former commander in chief of the U.S. Space Command, General Howell Estes, has argued that war in space is inevitable.19 Unsurprisingly, therefore the U.S. Space Command has established a Space Warfare Center and has aggressively advocated having "space" declared its area of operations so as to facilitate planning for conflict there.20 Similarly, the former Air Force Chief of Staff, General Ronald Fogelman predicted that space would someday become the service' s principal focus, the service evolving from an air and space force to a space and air force.21
However, there is little international appetite for the notion of conflict in space. Virtually every treaty related to space asserts that it is to be used only for "peaceful purposes. to] establish the principle of freedom of space, to protect U.S. satellites from interference, and to avoid an arms race in space"2* "Neutralizing" space would not appear to degrade America's war-fighting capability, provided U.S. space systems were therefore protected. In any event, existing legal and policy norms already limit or preclude attack on the multiuser international systems that adversaries will rely upon during war.
This space neutralization proposal would not preclude subspace means that selectively deny adversaries' military forces the use of signals from space platforms. However, the development of lasers and other space weapons would be prohibited, although passive defensive measures (hardening, stealth, etc.) would be allowed. Accordingly, the proposal wouldnot be inconsistent with current U.S. space policy, which advocates diplomatic and legal "measures to preclude an adversary's hostile use of space systems and services."25 Some may?and, in fact, already do?argue that the movement of weaponry into space is inevitable
and cannot be effectively banned.26 But the remarkable history of nuclear arms control (during which many of the same arguments were made) leaves room for optimism?especially if action is taken soon.
Paralleling the problematic commingling of military and civilian high-technology facilities is the tremendous infusion of civilians into formerly military jobs that has occurred of late. In the past few years, there has been a determined effort to convert as many military billets as possible to less expensive civilian positions.27 These initiatives have resulted in thousands of civilians filling what were once military assignments at stateside bases and, increasingly, on overseas deployments.28
The trend toward civilianization exacerbates the long-held fear that new technology requiring ever-greater civilian involvement will cloud a principle vital to the law of armed conflict:29 the requirement to distinguish between combatants who could be legitimately attacked, and noncombatants who could not. As with civilian objects, current international law requires belligerents to exercise "care to separate individual civilians and the civilian population as such from the vicinity of military objectives."30 International law does, of course, recognize that civilian technicians and contractors are necessary for modern militaries. It holds that they are subject to attack only when actually performing tasks in support of the armed forces. Unlike uniformed personnel, they are not ordinarily targeted when away from their jobs. If captured, they are entitled to treatment as prisoners of war.31 Nonetheless, the law has always held that noncombatants' "immunity from Century Air Force the service states that "combat operations in the 21st Century" will broaden "the definition of the future operator."34 It goes on to state that: "in the future, any military or civilian member who is experienced in the employment and doctrine of air and space power will be considered an operator."1* Once civilian technicians or contractors become involved as "operators" in "combat operations", they risk being characterized as "unlawful combatants" under international law.36 This has a number of consequences, including the possibility that, if captured these civilians can be tried and punished for their hostile acts, to include the same things for which a uniformed combatant would have immunity.37 It is very doubtful that many of these "surrogate warriors" are cognizant of their new status or comprehend the ramifications of it.
Another difficult challenge for legal advisors is that posed when military force is used in an effort to communicate "messages" to opponents. Although using force merely to terrorize noncombatant civilians is contrary to international law, affecting the mental state of an adversary, degrading morale, and eroding the will to continue the conflict can all constitute legitimate military objectives.38 The difficulty, as Geoffrey Best notes, lies in reliably quantifying such amorphous and often quite culturally specific psychological concepts to the point where one could reasonably conclude before the attack that a "definite military advantage" would be achieved.39 An unlawful combatant is an individual who is not authorized to take a direct part in hostilities but does. The term is frequently used also to refer to otherwise privileged combatants who do not comply with requirements of mode of dress, or noncombatants in the armed forces who improperly use their protected status as a shield to engage in hostilities . . . Unlawful combatants are a proper object of attack while engaging as combatants ... If captured, they may be tried and punished.
See also Lt Colonel Robert W. Gehring, Loss of Civilian Protections Under the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol /, 90 MIL. L. REV. 49 (1980) . 37 "Unlawful combatants" are not ordinarily considered "war criminals." Rather, they would be subject to prosecution under the domestic law of the belligerent who captures them, much as out-of-uniform saboteurs would be. Beyond the difficulties that cultural differences may produce in terms of conducting a proper proportionality analysis, they also may be the source of tomorrow's wars, if Harvard University political scientist Samuel P. Huntington is correct. He contends that future conflicts will likely be clashes between civilizations with fundamentally different psychological orientations and value sets than those of the West.42
Within some of these civilizations, I submit, there is another disturbing phenomenon brewing, one with grave implications for those concerned with compliance with international law in bellum. It is described in a brilliant piece by Ralph Peters, then a U.S. Army major, that appeared in the summer 1994 issue of Parameters. In it, Peters delineated what he calls "the New Warrior Class," a multitude which he contends "already numbers in the millions." Peters says that in the future,
[America] will face [warriors] who have acquired a taste for killing, who do not behave rationally according to our definition of rationality, who are capable of atrocities that challenge the descriptive powers of language, and who will sacrifice their own kind in order to survive.
Along similar lines, military historian John Keegan observes that the post-Cold War world is experiencing the reemergence of "warrior" societies in Chechnya, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Somalia, central Asia and elsewhere. These are peoples, he says, who are psychologically distinct from those of the West, and whose children are "brought up to fight, think fighting honorable and think killing in warfare glorious." A warrior in such societies, Keegan wrote in 1995, "prefers death to dishonor and kills without pity when he gets the chance." I believe that we will see?and, indeed, have already seen?these adversaries wage what I call neo-absolutist war. It is war without rules, one that uses atrocity as a deliberate strategy. 14 ASIL Proceedings, 1999
The deaths of eighteen U.S. Army Rangers during a mission in Somalia in October 1993 were enough to derail U.S. policy there, even though from a purely military standpoint the raid achieved its objectives and the U.S. losses were miniscule compared with those of the enemy. What proved to be particularly effective, however, was the barbaric treatment of the body of a U.S. soldier. The widely televised images of the body being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu helped destroy the public support that the U.S. military needed to succeed in Somalia. Consistent with a neo-absolutist approach, the Somalis made no attempt to hide the savagery of their act. Americans should also expect enemies to exploit the casualty aversion phenomenon discussed earlier in this paper?even at the expense of their own people. Such tactics may have been unintentionally inspired by the aftermath of the bombing of Baghdad's Al Firdos bunker during the Gulf War. Unbeknownst to coalition target selectors, that underground command and-control facility was also being used to shelter the families of high Iraqi officials. After the devastating attack that destroyed the bunker, pictures of scores of bodies of women and children being pulled from the wreckage were broadcast worldwide. This caused U.S.
leaders?concerned about adverse public reaction to the noncombatant deaths?to virtually end further raids on the Iraqi capital.
Though the decision to forego further operations against Baghdad had little effect on the outcome of the war, the precedent is important. The United States' response to the unexpected results of the Al Firdos bombing obviously suggests to some foes a cheap and reliable method of defending against U.S. strikes: cover the target with noncombatants. It seems that this tactic has been embraced by a number of opponents. Human shield tactics enabled the Serbs to discourage strikes by U.S. and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization planes by the simple expedient of chaining captured UN troops to potential targets. Libya has likewise threatened to surround the reported site of an underground chemical plant with "millions of Muslims" in order to ward off attacks.43
To reiterate, despite U.S. technological prowess that seems to herald an era of surgical attacks that limit noncombatant losses, I predict that adversaries will seek to offset U.S.
military capabilities by turning American values and adherence to international law against the United States. The result may be organized violence even more savage than in the past. While there are some military strategies that can be employed to confront this new form of war, an important role is to be played by such efforts as the International Court of Justice now in place in The Hague. I think that there is real value to clearly demonstrating to the perpetrators of war crimes that they will be called to account for their actions. Indeed, I favor the use of military force to apprehend those suspected of committing atrocities. That said, I must tell you that I do not support the new International Criminal Court in its present form. My opposition is on somewhat different grounds than what you may have heard from other speakers. I believe it is wrong?and unwise?to subject American soldiers to prosecution by a court that does not meet the minimum standards of the U.S. Constitution. In an era in which the United States must rely upon a professional, volunteer force, good civil military relations mandates that the members of such a force be treated as far as possible like every other citizen. To do otherwise risks the alienation and isolation of the armed forces from society, a development much discussed lately in sociological circles and, in any event, one not in the interests of any democracy. What is more, the United States has repeatedly demonstrated that it will bring to justice within its own military system those persons accused of the commission of war crimes and other criminal acts.
Before closing, I wish to add a few more observations. I hope that my comments thus far indicate how necessary it is these days for legal advisers to have a thorough comprehension 43 Libyans to form shield at suspected arms plant, BALTIMORE SUN, May 17, 1996, at 14.
